Contact and Context: How Municipal Traffic Stops Shape Citizen Character

Running Title: Municipal Traffic Stops Shape Citizen Character

Allison P. Anoll*, Derek A. Epp†, Mackenzie Israel-Trummel‡

Abstract

Previous research shows that how the state conducts itself influences citizen attitudes and behaviors through direct and proximal contact; we show the actions of state agents ripple out even further. Joining bureaucratic data on a publicly observable state behavior—racial disparities in investigatory traffic stops—with survey data, this article shows that residing in a place with extreme racial disparities in traffic stops is associated with depressed confidence in the police even in the absence of more direct forms of contact. This relationship does not extend to participatory behaviors, however, where only personal stop history and proximal contact are predictors. Racially disparate policing practices, then, may undermine law enforcement legitimacy in a community as a whole, but mobilization to change policy appears limited to individuals who more directly experience the carceral state.

Keywords: traffic stops, political participation, context, police, carceral state

Supplementary material for this article is available in the appendix in the online edition. Replication files are available in the JOP Data Archive on Dataverse (http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/jop). The empirical analysis has been successfully replicated by the JOP replication analyst. This study was conducted in compliance with relevant laws and was approved by the IRBs at Vanderbilt University and the University of Oklahoma. Funding for the Race and Carceral State Survey was provided by Vanderbilt University and the University of Oklahoma.

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John Stuart Mill and Jean-Jacques Rousseau posited that citizens are not born, but made: forged by the state into the actors they are taught to become (see Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, for a review). Scholarly descendants since have shown people learn from the state about the purpose of government and their role within it. From a series of groundbreaking works, we know that direct interactions with the American welfare and carceral states shape citizen trust, efficacy, and political involvement (e.g., Mettler 2005; Michener 2018; Soss 2000; Lerman and Weaver 2014), and that these effects can spiral outward (Burch 2013; Walker 2020). In this article, we argue that racially disparate, publicly observable policing practices also shape citizen attitudes toward the state, above-and-beyond more direct experiences. Our focus is on the degree of racial disparities in investigatory traffic stops, a statistic that varies across municipalities and represents a publicly observable state action. Citizens who are not the target of these state interventions can still observe them and through such public actions, municipal police forces may develop reputations that shape political behavior.

We merge bureaucratic records on police stops in Illinois and North Carolina with individual-level survey data on direct interactions with the police, proximal carceral contact, evaluations of police quality, and political participation. This unique data set allows us to test the relationship between contextual-level state behavior and individual-level attitudes, net personal and proximal contact. We find that racial disparities in police behavior are indeed associated with citizen attitudes. Living in a municipality with the most anti-Black policing behavior compared to one with racially equal investigatory stops is associated with a similar decay in police trust as being stopped three or more times by law enforcement in recent years compared to those who have not been stopped. This substantively large relationship, though, is limited to institution-specific *attitudes*. Looking at both voting and non-voting acts, we find that racial disparities in police behavior have no relationship to political engagement. The results suggest that while the public choices of state actors can shift perceptions of legitimacy, it is direct and proximal contact that ultimately influence democratic behavior. A causal test of this relationship is beyond the scope of this article, but our documentation of the descriptive relationship between policing practices and perceptions of legitimacy should encourage more scholarly attention to this topic.

State Character, Citizen Character

In the early 21st century, a series of trailblazing books asked how state contact influences citizens. Scholars showed that recipients of benefits programs learn about the purpose of government via interactions (Mettler 2005; Michener 2018; Soss 2000). These interactions can foster increased political efficacy and participation, but they can also have nefarious effects. If perceived as procedurally unfair, interacting with justice-enforcing institutions like the police, jails, prisons, courts, and probation officers can train people to fear the government and withdraw from politics (Davis 2021; Justice and Meares 2014; Lerman and Weaver 2014; Tyler 2004; White 2019*b*). These direct interactions also influence loved ones (Anoll and Israel-Trummel 2019; Bowers and Preuhs 2009; Lee, Porter and Comfort 2014; Walker 2020; Walker and García-Castañon 2017; White 2019*a*), and if large enough, can alter voting patterns for entire neighborhoods and social groups (Burch 2013; 2014; Maltby 2017).

We ask: can the public behaviors of state officials teach citizen observers more broadly about the nature of the state and their role within it, even without direct experience? We propose that when state actors engage in publicly observable actions like traffic stops, citizens can learn about institutional legitimacy, quality, and responsiveness even without direct or proximal contact. Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel (2014, 24) suggest traffic stops are frequently witnessed by other drivers and define racial meaning in the eyes of the public. Others show public opinion is sensitive to rising incarceration rates (Muller and Schrage 2014). Responses to policing practices, which are both more visible and more localized, should induce widespread learning. Such learning may take place gradually over many years and be assisted by local media coverage, interpersonal communication, or social justice advocates. As state actors develop a reputation for engaging in practices perceived as procedurally unfair, trust in political institutions should fall (Tyler 2004) and this may shape whether individuals withdraw from political life (Lerman and Weaver 2014) or engage to change the system (Walker 2020). Given the importance of context to the development of political attitudes (e.g., Michener 2013), this relationship might be substantial.

Our focus is on investigatory traffic stops, or those designed to bring an officer into contact with a person of interest rather than simply to enforce traffic safety (Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014). Much like their pedestrian cousin, "stop, question, frisk," these controversial policing practices happen in public spaces and in ways that are often perceived

as highly invasive and procedurally unfair (Meares 2014; Mummolo 2018). Racial disparities in these stops then may teach municipal residents more broadly that the state is an institution of (unjust) punishment (Lerman and Weaver 2013).

Measuring Personal Experience and Community Context

To test this, we merge individual-level survey data from a sample of Black and White Americans who live in North Carolina and Illinois with bureaucratic records on policing. In these two states, officers are mandated to document the circumstances of their stops, including: why the stop was made, the driver's race/ethnicity, and the stop's outcome. These bureaucratic data, which span 2002–2016 for North Carolina and 2004–2014 for Illinois, allow us to identify patterns in police behavior over time in a way that we expect is observable to residents and contributes to the reputation of the police force. We merge this data with our survey, fielded from May 11 to June 13, 2017 by Survey Sampling International, using zip codes. The data set includes 893 respondents spread across 384 municipalities.[1]

As our primary independent variable, we calculate the percent of total stops in each municipality that are investigatory—i.e. the initial purpose is related to vehicular equipment, registration issues, or a seat belt violation—for Black and White drivers separately.[2] The rate of Black investigatory stops is then divided by the rate of White investigatory stops for each municipality, producing a ratio measure that indicates the degree of racial disparity for this type of stop. We subtract 1 from this ratio so that values below 0 indicate that a police department is more likely to stop White drivers for investigatory reasons and values above 0 indicate a disparity in the direction of Black drivers. The measure ranges from -1 to 1.48.

Our use of this measure is informed by empirical and theoretical considerations. Theoretically, we propose it indicates municipalities where racial disparities in policing are widespread. Disparities in invasive police practices are thought to bundle together (Carbado 2017; Roach et al. 2020); therefore, our measure is best imagined as a proxy for a broader environment of

[1]This data collection effort was part of a national opt-in online survey of roughly 12,000 respondents (Anoll and Israel-Trummel 2017). Our analytical approach allows us to examine the average effect of police practices across municipalities in these states, but we are not able to estimate the relationship within a singular municipality.

[2]This is in contrast to stops more clearly related to safety— e.g., speeding, running a red light, driving erratically— and is informed by existing work (Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014; Baumgartner, Epp and Shoub 2018).

Figure 1: Distributions of Independent Variables



disparities including invasive, street-level—and hence, observable—policing practices. Empirically, its construction sidesteps the need to identify the underlying (and unknown) population of motorists by examining a subset of stops from total stops for each racial group.

Figure 1a shows the distribution of the *investigatory stops* ratio across the 384 municipalities in our sample. The mean of 0.18 indicates that, on average, investigatory stops are more common for Black drivers than for White across municipalities. Municipalities with the greatest disparities include both rural and urban locations as well as municipalities that are majority White and majority Black.[3] In our sample, 92% of respondents live in municipalities where investigatory stops are more likely to target Black motorists.

Figure 1b shows the distribution of *personal stops* separately for Black and White respondents. Respondents were asked how frequently they had been stopped and questioned by police in the past five years. We plot the percent of each group that reports zero, one to two, and three plus stops, with 80% confidence intervals to visually indicate a two-sample t-test. Racial disparities in interactions with the police are evident. Sixty-two percent of Whites in these two states report no contact with the police in the last five years, compared to 50% of Black respondents (Welch's t-test, p=0.00). In contrast, 15% of Black compared to only 6% of White respondents report three or more stops (Welch's t-test, p=0.00).

We test the relationship between these measures and evaluations of police performance and political activity. Respondents were asked how good of a job the police are doing to: solve

[3]Five small towns populated almost entirely with White people account for the -1 values.

crime; protect people like you from violent crime; treat racial and ethnic groups equally; not use excessive force on suspects; and hold officers accountable for misconduct (Ekins 2016). We index these measures to create a scale from 0 to 20 where larger numbers indicate more positive evaluations ($\alpha = 0.923$). Two measures capture political participation: self-reported voter turnout in 2016 and an index of non-voting participatory acts.[4] Given the small numbers of highly active respondents, we pool those who performed three or more acts together so that the index ranges from 0 to 3. Considering extant work documenting effects of proximal contact on participation (e.g., Walker 2020), we include a measure of close social ties to people with a felony conviction as well as controls for crime victim status, felony conviction status, gender, income, education, age, ideology, and race (see appendix for question wordings).

Results

We use mixed effects linear regressions—models that incorporate both fixed and random effects—which account for the nested nature of our data where respondents are located in both states and zip codes (Bates et al. 2015).[5] Table 1 shows the results for our three dependent variables. People stopped one or two times by the police in the last five years are less positive in their evaluations of law enforcement compared to those who report never being stopped (β=-0.78, p=0.04), as are those reporting three or more stops (β=-1.19, p=0.06). Proximal contact with the carceral state—measured here as close ties to people with felony convictions—is also negatively related to evaluations of the police (β=-1.05, p=0.00). Independent of direct and proximal contact though, variation in municipal police behavior is associated with evaluations of law enforcement. As anti-Black racial disparities in investigatory stops increase, evaluations of police performance fall (β=-1.01, p=0.01). People who live in the most anti-Black policing contexts are expected to evaluate the police 1.50 points more negatively than those in municipalities that have racially equal investigatory stops. The size of this effect is nearly double the change in evaluations of law enforcement among those who have not been stopped compared to those stopped 1–2 times, and larger than the expected decline of 1.05 points for those who have one close social tie with a felony conviction compared

[4] In the past year did you: attend a community meeting, contact an official, donate money to a candidate or organization, volunteer for a campaign, sign a petition, or attend a protest.

[5] Appendix tables A2–A3 show that our results are not model-dependent. They replicate in OLS models and when using zip-level correlates rather than random effects.

Table 1: Policing Context and Personal Stop History on Views of Police and Participation

	Evaluation of Police	Turnout	Participatory Acts
(Intercept)	6.70 (0.74)*	0.49 (0.06)*	0.69 (0.17)*
% Invest. Stops Ratio	−1.01 (0.37)*	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.08 (0.08)
Stopped 1-2 times	−0.78 (0.37)*	−0.00 (0.03)	0.28 (0.08)*
Stopped 3+ times	−1.19 (0.64)†	0.11 (0.05)*	0.20 (0.14)
Proximal carceral contact	−1.05 (0.25)*	−0.01 (0.02)	0.13 (0.06)*
Controls	✓	✓	✓
AIC	4530.34	810.83	2272.15
BIC	4604.58	885.07	2346.39
Log Likelihood	−2249.17	−389.41	−1120.08

Mixed linear regressions with random effects for state and zip code. Full table in appendix (A1). $^{\dagger}p < 0.10$,* $p < 0.05$. N=765; sample size reflects incomplete data on some covariates.

to those with zero.

This relationship is not driven by Black respondents. In robustness tests (appendix tables A4–A5), the negative effect of racial bias in investigatory police stops persists when analyzing Whites separately, while the effect of the police stops ratio is negative but insignificant among Black respondents—perhaps due to sample size (N=275). That we do not find divergent effects of policing context by race is surprising, given how racial inequalities in other components of the carceral state affect the attitudes of Black residents more so than White (Maltby 2017). We further interrogate these results by dropping municipalities with few stops (appendix tables A11–A13) and by using alternative specifications of our investigatory stops measure (appendix tables A9–A10). Throughout, the association between police behavior and evaluations of police quality persists.[6] These results suggest that when the state engages in racially biased actions, it undermines the legitimacy and perceived quality of its agents, and not just among those bearing the brunt of disparate treatment.

Next, we turn to political participation. Disparities in police behavior may create a mobilizing effect where people respond to perceived injustice through political action (e.g., Walker 2020); a demobilizing effect where a racially discriminatory environment depresses political involvement (e.g., Lerman and Weaver 2014); or have no direct effect, with the impact

[6]We also test whether there is an interactive relationship between policing practices and personal or proximal contact and find none (appendix tables A6–A8).

of racially disparate police practices influencing only political attitudes and not behavior. Table 1 shows that municipal-level racial disparities in investigatory traffic stops are not associated with participation. Additional tests confirm this is the case for both racial groups (appendix tables A4–A5). Personal stop history, on the other hand, shows a positive and significant association with political involvement. Those experiencing three or more stops in the last five years are 11 percentage points more likely to vote than their counterparts with no individual-level contact (p=0.04); people stopped one or two times in preceding years complete on average 0.28 additional acts (p=0.00), an effect robust for Black and White Americans when analyzed separately (appendix tables A4–A5). Finally, those with the most proximal contact are expected to perform an additional 0.27 acts (p=0.02), though this variable has no relationship to voting.

Conclusion

Citizens become less willing to provide aid for criminal investigations, report victimization, and support law enforcement funding when the perceived legitimacy of police deteriorates (Peyton, Sierra-Arévalo and Rand 2019; Tyler 2004). Our results suggest that when municipal police forces engage in observable, racially disparate policing practices such as investigatory traffic stops, their perceived legitimacy declines. It does so not just among those with direct or proximal contact, but in the community as a whole. Our evidence is observational, but it makes a vital first step in documenting how policing context, not just contact, might erode institutional legitimacy. In establishing this relationship, we lay the groundwork for others to investigate the exact conditions and mechanisms surrounding these results.

Racial disparities in police behavior are related to institution-specific attitudes, but we also show they do not predict participation. Rather, only personal and proximal contact are associated with these behaviors. The mobilizing effect of proximal contact is well-documented (Walker 2020), but the positive relationship between direct contact and formal participation contrasts with previous scholarship (e.g., Lerman and Weaver 2014). One explanation is that opportunities to mobilize around this issue have increased substantially as the Black Lives Matter movement has proliferated. Data from before the movement's inception or during its early years may miss how organizers are increasingly ushering those with negative experiences into politics to challenge aggressive policing practices.

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Contact and Context: How Municipal Traffic Stops Shape Citizen Character: Online Appendix

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1 Ethical Research Practices

The Race and Carceral State Survey (Anoll and Israel-Trummel 2017) was administered to a pool of consenting and anonymous adults, recruited by the online survey company, Survey Sampling International (now Dynata). Two of this paper's authors were the principle investigators. We contracted with Survey Sampling International who paid participants in line with standard payment practices in the US. Participants included a diverse pool of respondents with respect to age, gender, region, income and education, but who all indicated at the beginning of the survey that they were either White or Black/African American. Respondents consented to participate in the survey after reading the following information, which appeared on the first page of the survey:

Study Title: Public Opinion on Policing in America

The following information is provided to inform you about the research project and your participation in it. Your participation in this study is voluntary. You are free to withdraw from this study at any time.

1. Purpose and Procedures: The purpose of this study is to better understand American's opinions on policies pertaining to policing in the United States. Over the next 20 minutes, you will answer survey questions online about your opinions on and experiences with this topic.

2. Risks and Benefits: There are no associated risks with this study. The only cost to you is the time it takes to complete the survey. Your participation might help Americans and policy makers better understand citizens' opinions on policing policies and reform. You will be compensated for your time in compliance with your pre-specified agreement with the survey company.

3. Contact Information: If you have any questions about this research study, please feel free to contact Dr. Allison Anoll at (615) 322-2726 or allison.p.anoll@vanderbilt.edu or Dr. Mackenzie Israel-Trummel at (405) 325-4890 or mackisr@ou.edu. For additional information about your rights as a participant in this study, to discuss problems, concerns, and questions, or to offer input, please feel free to contact the Vanderbilt Institutional Review Board Office at (615) 322-2918 or toll free at (866) 224-8273 or the University of Oklahoma Institutional Review Board Office at (405) 325-8110 or irb@ou.edu.

4. Confidentiality: This is an anonymous survey. The researcher will not have access to personally identifying information that could link your answers to you.

- I agree to participate
- I do not want to participate

2 Survey Questions

Dependent Variables

Evaluation of Police. How well would you say the police are doing at each of the following...

1. Solving crime
2. Protecting people like you from violent crime
3. Treating racial and ethnic groups equally
4. Not using excessive force on suspects
5. Holding police officers accountable for misconduct

- Poor (0)
- Fair (1)
- Average (2)
- Good (3)
- Excellent (4)

The five items were indexed to create a scale ranging from 0 to 20 with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.9231771. The alpha is similarly high when subset to only White (0.9068032) or Black (0.8985843) respondents.

Participation. In the past year or so, have you done any of the following?

1. Voted in the 2016 Presidential Election
2. Attended a community meeting
3. Written, called, or spoke to a government official
4. Donated money to a political candidate or organization
5. Volunteered for a political campaign
6. Signed a petition
7. Attended a rally, protest, or demonstration
8. None

Respondents who indicated that they voted were coded as 1 on the variable *Turnout*. The variable *Participatory Acts* was coded by indexing 2–7 of the acts above and then pooling together those who scored 3 or higher.

Independent Variables

Stopped. In the past five years or so, how many times do you recall being stopped or questioned by the police?

- 0 (0)
- 1–2 (1)
- 3–4 (2)
- 5 or more (2)

Proximal Carceral Contact. Have any of your closest friends and family ever been convicted of a felony crime?

- No (0)
- Yes, 1 person (1)
- Yes, 2 people (2)
- Yes, 3 or more people (2)

Crime Victim. Have you, yourself, been the victim of a serious crime in the last 5 years?

- Yes (1)
- No (0)

Felony Conviction. Have you ever been convicted of or pled guilty to a felony since turning 18 years old?

- Yes (1)
- No (0)
- Not sure (NA)

Income. Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?

- Less than $10,000 (0)
- $10,000–$19,999 (1)
- $20,000–$29,999 (2)
- $30,000–$39,999 (3)
- $40,000–$49,999 (4)
- $50,000–$59,999 (5)
- $60,000–$69,999 (6)
- $70,000–$79,999 (7)
- $80,000–$99,999 (8)
- $100,000–$119,999 (9)
- $120,000–$149,999 (10)
- More than $150,000 (11)

Conservatism. In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?

- Very liberal (0)
- Liberal (1)
- Moderate (2)
- Conservative (3)
- Very conservative (4)
- Not sure (NA)

Education. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- Did not graduate from high school (0)
- High school graduate (1)
- Some college, but no degree (yet) (2)
- 2-year college degree (3)
- 4-year college degree (4)
- Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.) (4)

Woman. Are you a man or woman?

- Man (0)
- Woman (1)

White. What racial or ethnic group best describes you?

- White (1)
- Black or African-American (0)
- Asian or Asian-American (terminate)
- Native American (terminate)
- Mixed Race (terminate)
- Other (please specify) (terminate)

Age. In what year were you born? Age calculated as 2016−birthyear, then recoded:

- 18–29 (0)
- 30–44 (1)
- 45–64 (2)
- 65+ (3)

Illinois. What state do you live in?

- North Carolina (0)
- Illinois (1)

3 Traffic Stops Data

For data on traffic stops made by North Carolina police officers, we use the replication file for the book *Suspect Citizens: What 20 Million Traffic Stops Tell Us About Policing and Race* by Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp, and Kelsey Shoub (2018). This data is originally available from the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (https://trafficstops.ncsbi.gov/).

For data on traffic stops made by Illinois police officers, we use the replication file for "At the Intersection: Race, Gender, and Discretion in Police Traffic Stop Outcomes" by Kevin Roach, Frank R. Baumgartner, Leah Christiani, Derek A. Epp, and Kelsey Shoub in the *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* (2020). This data is originally available from the Illinois Department of Transportation (https://idot.illinois.gov/transportation-system/local-transportation-partners/law-enforcement/illinois-traffic-stop-study).

Both datasets are based on self-reporting by police officers who are required to fill out paperwork documenting each stop that they make. As with most administrative records, typos and other clerical errors are possible. These would introduce noise into our estimates. A more serious concern is if officers purposefully misreport their record to obfuscate their behavior. We are unable to rule out this possibility but note that our measure of racial disparity is drawn from at least 10 years of data covering the behavior of thousands of officers, so this type of misreporting would have to be widespread to create a systematic bias. Even if that was the case, it is unlikely that bias would be correlated with public evaluations of the police.

Both the North Carolina and Illinois data have been featured in a variety of publications on policing and are widely available, including through the Stanford Policing Project (https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/). For examples, see:

- Baumgartner, Frank R., Leah Christiani, Derek A. Epp, Kevin Roach, and Kelsey Shoub. 2017. "Racial Disparities in Traffic Stop Outcomes." *Duke Forum for Law and Social Change* 9: 21–53.
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Survey respondents were asked to provide their residential zip code, which we used to connect them with the traffic stops record of their municipal police department. For example, a respondent providing a Chicago zip code would be linked to the traffic stops statistics for the Chicago Police Department. Respondents from small towns without their own police department were linked to the statistics for the county sheriff's department that operates in their town.

4 Robustness Tests

Summary of Tables and Figures: Unless otherwise noted, each model is a mixed linear regression including random effects for state and zip code.

- Table A1 shows the full models from the paper.
- Table A2 uses OLS to test whether our findings are model-dependent. Our findings persist.
- Table A3 uses OLS and includes a variety of zip-level correlates (Manson et al. 2020). Our findings persist.
- Table A4 restricts the analysis to Black respondents. We pool together those stopped by police more than once due to smaller sample size. The significance of police contact persists in models of police evaluation and non-voting participation. The investigatory stops ratio loses significance on police evaluations but is still negative.
- Table A5 restricts the analysis to White respondents. We pool together those stopped by police more than once due to smaller sample size. The significance of investigatory stops on evaluations and police contact on non-voting participation persists. Contact with police loses significance on police evaluations and turnout.
- Table A6 interacts policing context (investigatory stops ratio) with personal stop history. We do not find significant interactions. In some of the models the main effects drop below the threshold for statistical significance but generally we still find negative effects of police context and contact on evaluations and positive effects of police contact on non-voting participation.
- Table A7 repeats Table A6 but collapses police contact into a binary variable. Generally our findings are the same as in Table A6.
- Table A8 interacts policing context (investigatory stops ratio) with proximal carceral contact (coded binary). We do not find significant interaction, with the exception of the turnout model, in which we find a marginally significant interaction between the stops ratio and proximal contact. Given that this is the only interaction that even approaches statistical significance, and it fails to achieve significance at the $p < 0.05$ level, we are not confident that this result is reliable.
- Table A9 repeats the analysis from the paper, but recodes the investigatory stops ratio as an absolute value. Zero means there is no difference in the ratio of stops of White and Black motorists and positive values cannot differentiate between those municipalities where White motorists are disproportionately likely to be stopped and those where Black motorists are more likely to be stopped. The findings persist.
- Table A10 subsets the data to drop police departments that are more likely to stop White than Black motorists. Our findings persist.
- Tables A11–A13 drop respondents in municipalities with small numbers of stops of either White or Black motorists. Table A11 drops those municipalities with fewer than 10 stops of either White or Black motorists. Table A12 uses a threshold of 50 stops and Table A13 uses a threshold of 100 stops. The findings persists across all three tables.

References

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Table A1: Policing Context and Personal Stop History on Views of Police and Participation (Full Table from Paper)

	Evaluation of Police	Turnout	Participatory Acts
(Intercept)	6.70 (0.74)*	0.49 (0.06)*	0.69 (0.17)*
% Invest. Stops Ratio	−1.01 (0.37)*	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.08 (0.08)
Stopped 1-2 times	−0.78 (0.37)*	−0.00 (0.03)	0.28 (0.08)*
Stopped 3+ times	−1.19 (0.64)†	0.11 (0.05)*	0.20 (0.14)
Proximal carceral contact	−1.05 (0.25)*	−0.01 (0.02)	0.13 (0.06)*
Crime victim	0.26 (0.72)	−0.04 (0.06)	0.17 (0.16)
Felony conviction	−0.24 (0.76)	0.01 (0.06)	0.04 (0.17)
Income	0.06 (0.06)	0.01 (0.00)*	0.03 (0.01)*
Conservatism	0.73 (0.16)*	−0.02 (0.01)†	−0.09 (0.04)*
Education	0.11 (0.15)	0.06 (0.01)*	0.15 (0.03)*
Woman	−0.22 (0.37)	0.05 (0.03)†	0.06 (0.08)
White	3.45 (0.42)*	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.23 (0.09)*
Age	0.50 (0.18)*	0.10 (0.02)*	0.02 (0.04)
AIC	4530.34	810.83	2272.15
BIC	4604.58	885.07	2346.39
Log Likelihood	−2249.17	−389.41	−1120.08
Num. obs.	765	765	765
Num. groups: zip:Illinois	487	487	487
Num. groups: Illinois	2	2	2
Var: zip:Illinois (Intercept)	0.58	0.00	0.07
Var: Illinois (Intercept)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Var: Residual	20.47	0.15	0.97

Mixed linear models including random effects for state and zip code. $^\dagger p < 0.10, ^* p < 0.05$

Table A2: Policing Context and Personal Stop History on Views of Police and Participation, OLS

	Evaluation of Police	Turnout	Participatory Acts
(Intercept)	6.67 (0.75)*	0.48 (0.06)*	0.68 (0.17)*
% Invest. Stops Ratio	−1.02 (0.38)*	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.08 (0.09)
Stopped 1-2 times	−0.79 (0.37)*	−0.00 (0.03)	0.28 (0.08)*
Stopped 3+ times	−1.21 (0.64)†	0.11 (0.05)*	0.21 (0.14)
Proximal carceral contact	−1.05 (0.25)*	−0.01 (0.02)	0.13 (0.06)*
Crime victim	0.28 (0.72)	−0.04 (0.06)	0.18 (0.16)
Felony conviction	−0.24 (0.76)	0.01 (0.06)	0.06 (0.17)
Income	0.06 (0.06)	0.01 (0.00)*	0.03 (0.01)*
Conservatism	0.74 (0.16)*	−0.02 (0.01)†	−0.09 (0.04)*
Education	0.11 (0.15)	0.06 (0.01)*	0.14 (0.03)*
Woman	−0.20 (0.37)	0.05 (0.03)†	0.06 (0.08)
White	3.45 (0.42)*	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.22 (0.09)*
Age	0.50 (0.18)*	0.10 (0.02)*	0.02 (0.04)
Illinois	0.01 (0.36)	0.01 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.08)
R^2	0.28	0.11	0.09
Adj. R^2	0.26	0.10	0.07
Num. obs.	765	765	765

OLS models to test for robustness of results to model choice. $^\dagger p < 0.10$,$^* p < 0.05$

Table A3: Inclusion of Zip Correlates

	Evaluation of Police	Turnout	Participatory Acts
(Intercept)	4.85 (2.90)†	0.28 (0.24)	0.17 (0.64)
% Invest. Stops Ratio	−1.02 (0.50)*	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.11 (0.11)
Stopped 1-2 times	−0.81 (0.37)*	−0.00 (0.03)	0.28 (0.08)*
Stopped 3+ times	−1.15 (0.65)†	0.12 (0.05)*	0.20 (0.14)
Proximal carceral contact	−1.07 (0.26)*	−0.01 (0.02)	0.13 (0.06)*
Crime victim	0.30 (0.74)	−0.01 (0.06)	0.20 (0.16)
Felony conviction	−0.27 (0.76)	−0.00 (0.06)	0.07 (0.17)
Income	0.06 (0.06)	0.01 (0.01)*	0.04 (0.01)*
Conservatism	0.72 (0.16)*	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.09 (0.04)*
Education	0.10 (0.15)	0.06 (0.01)*	0.14 (0.03)*
Woman	−0.15 (0.37)	0.06 (0.03)†	0.08 (0.08)
White	3.72 (0.47)*	−0.06 (0.04)	−0.36 (0.10)*
Age	0.51 (0.18)*	0.10 (0.02)*	0.04 (0.04)
Illinois	0.17 (0.40)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.09)
Zip-level correlates			
Prop. Black	−1.80 (2.69)	−0.45 (0.23)*	−0.84 (0.59)
Prop. White	−3.59 (2.72)	−0.28 (0.23)	−0.05 (0.60)
Median Income	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)*
Prop. BA or higher	−0.18 (1.91)	0.22 (0.16)	1.36 (0.42)*
Prop. U.S.-born	5.64 (4.54)	0.48 (0.38)	0.82 (1.00)
Prop. on Assistance	−4.30 (3.82)	0.23 (0.32)	0.89 (0.84)
R^2	0.28	0.12	0.11
Adj. R^2	0.26	0.10	0.09
Num. obs.	761	761	761

OLS models including 5-digit zip-level correlates from 2017 American Community Survey: 5-Year Data Set (2013-2017) (Manson et al. 2020). *Prop. black:* proportion of zip code that is either non-Hispanic or Hispanic Black; *prop. white:* proportion of zip code that is non-Hispanic White; *median income:* median household income in zip code over previous 12 months; *prop. BA or higher:* proportion of zip code that is at least 25 years of age and has at least a bachelors degree; *prop. U.S. born:* proportion of population born into US citizenship; *prop. on assistance:* proportion of households in zip code receiving public cash assistance or Food Stamps/SNAP in past 12 months $^{\dagger}p < 0.10$,$^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A4: Restricted to Black Respondents

	Evaluation of Police	Turnout	Participatory Acts
(Intercept)	7.91 (1.18)*	0.62 (0.10)*	0.48 (0.26)†
% Invest. Stops Ratio	−0.60 (0.53)	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.11 (0.12)
Stopped by police	−1.60 (0.64)*	−0.04 (0.05)	0.31 (0.14)*
Proximal carceral contact	−1.07 (0.39)*	0.02 (0.03)	0.17 (0.09)*
Crime victim	1.51 (1.15)	−0.02 (0.10)	0.24 (0.25)
Felony conviction	0.46 (1.25)	0.05 (0.11)	−0.12 (0.27)
Income	−0.03 (0.11)	0.01 (0.01)	0.06 (0.02)*
Conservatism	0.23 (0.32)	−0.06 (0.03)*	−0.02 (0.07)
Education	0.63 (0.27)*	0.06 (0.02)*	0.08 (0.06)
Woman	−0.74 (0.64)	0.03 (0.05)	0.12 (0.14)
Age	−0.31 (0.33)	0.07 (0.03)*	0.08 (0.07)
AIC	1671.80	367.38	871.04
BIC	1722.43	418.01	921.68
Log Likelihood	−821.90	−169.69	−421.52
Num. obs.	275	275	275
Num. groups: zip:Illinois	172	172	172
Num. groups: Illinois	2	2	2
Var: zip:Illinois (Intercept)	0.64	0.00	0.10
Var: Illinois (Intercept)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Var: Residual	23.54	0.17	1.07

Restricted to Black respondents only. Police stops variable recoded as binary due to sample size. Mixed linear models with random effects for state and zip code. $^\dagger p < 0.10, ^* p < 0.05$

Table A5: Restricted to White Respondents

	Evaluation of Police	Turnout	Participatory Acts
(Intercept)	8.93 (0.95)*	0.37 (0.08)*	0.62 (0.22)*
% Invest. Stops Ratio	−1.41 (0.54)*	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.01 (0.12)
Stopped by police	−0.43 (0.42)	0.04 (0.04)	0.26 (0.10)*
Proximal carceral contact	−0.89 (0.33)*	−0.03 (0.03)	0.07 (0.08)
Crime victim	−0.72 (0.90)	−0.02 (0.08)	0.06 (0.21)
Felony conviction	−0.72 (0.93)	0.01 (0.08)	0.18 (0.22)
Income	0.12 (0.07)†	0.01 (0.01)†	0.02 (0.02)
Conservatism	0.86 (0.18)*	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.11 (0.04)*
Education	−0.10 (0.18)	0.07 (0.02)*	0.17 (0.04)*
Woman	0.43 (0.46)	0.08 (0.04)†	−0.00 (0.11)
Age	0.90 (0.21)*	0.11 (0.02)*	−0.01 (0.05)
AIC	2841.25	498.89	1436.43
BIC	2899.97	557.61	1495.16
Log Likelihood	−1406.62	−235.44	−704.22
Num. obs.	490	490	490
Num. groups: zip:Illinois	375	375	375
Num. groups: Illinois	2	2	2
Var: zip:Illinois (Intercept)	1.62	0.00	0.09
Var: Illinois (Intercept)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Var: Residual	16.84	0.14	0.89

Restricted to White respondents only. Police stops variable recoded as binary due to sample size. Mixed linear models with random effects for state and zip code. $^{\dagger}p < 0.10$,$^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A6: Interacting Policing Context and Personal Stop History

	Evaluation of Police	Turnout	Participatory Acts
(Intercept)	6.67 (0.74)*	0.49 (0.06)*	0.68 (0.17)*
% Invest. Stops Ratio	−0.91 (0.45)*	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.07 (0.10)
Stopped 1-2 times	−0.67 (0.49)	−0.00 (0.04)	0.27 (0.11)*
Stopped 3+ times	−1.07 (0.81)	0.09 (0.07)	0.26 (0.18)
Proximal carceral contact	−1.05 (0.25)*	−0.01 (0.02)	0.13 (0.06)*
Crime victim	0.25 (0.72)	−0.04 (0.06)	0.16 (0.16)
Felony conviction	−0.23 (0.76)	0.00 (0.06)	0.05 (0.17)
Income	0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.00)*	0.03 (0.01)*
Conservatism	0.73 (0.16)*	−0.02 (0.01)†	−0.09 (0.04)*
Education	0.11 (0.15)	0.06 (0.01)*	0.15 (0.03)*
Woman	−0.22 (0.37)	0.05 (0.03)†	0.06 (0.08)
White	3.45 (0.42)*	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.23 (0.09)*
Age	0.50 (0.18)*	0.10 (0.02)*	0.02 (0.04)
Stops Ratio * Stopped 1–2	−0.26 (0.74)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.16)
Stops Ratio * Stopped 3+	−0.26 (1.11)	0.05 (0.09)	−0.13 (0.25)
AIC	4530.97	821.15	2278.62
BIC	4614.49	904.67	2362.14
Log Likelihood	−2247.48	−392.58	−1121.31
Num. obs.	765	765	765
Num. groups: zip:Illinois	487	487	487
Num. groups: Illinois	2	2	2
Var: zip:Illinois (Intercept)	0.59	0.00	0.07
Var: Illinois (Intercept)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Var: Residual	20.52	0.15	0.98

Mixed linear models with random effects for state and zip code. $^\dagger p < 0.10$,$^* p < 0.05$

Table A7: Interacting Policing Context and Binary Personal Stop History

	Evaluation of Police	Turnout	Participatory Acts
(Intercept)	6.64 (0.74)*	0.49 (0.06)*	0.68 (0.17)*
% Invest. Stops Ratio	−0.91 (0.45)*	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.07 (0.10)
Stopped by police	−0.73 (0.46)	0.01 (0.04)	0.27 (0.10)*
Proximal carceral contact	−1.06 (0.25)*	−0.01 (0.02)	0.13 (0.06)*
Crime victim	0.19 (0.72)	−0.02 (0.06)	0.15 (0.16)
Felony conviction	−0.27 (0.75)	0.02 (0.06)	0.04 (0.17)
Income	0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.00)*	0.03 (0.01)*
Conservatism	0.73 (0.16)*	−0.02 (0.01)†	−0.09 (0.04)*
Education	0.11 (0.15)	0.06 (0.01)*	0.14 (0.03)*
Woman	−0.21 (0.37)	0.05 (0.03)	0.06 (0.08)
White	3.46 (0.42)*	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.23 (0.09)*
Age	0.51 (0.18)*	0.09 (0.02)*	0.02 (0.04)
Stops Ratio * Stopped	−0.26 (0.67)	0.02 (0.06)	−0.02 (0.15)
AIC	4530.49	815.23	2272.28
BIC	4604.73	889.47	2346.52
Log Likelihood	−2249.25	−391.61	−1120.14
Num. obs.	765	765	765
Num. groups: zip:Illinois	487	487	487
Num. groups: Illinois	2	2	2
Var: zip:Illinois (Intercept)	0.61	0.00	0.07
Var: Illinois (Intercept)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Var: Residual	20.45	0.15	0.97

Pools those with any personal stop history together. Mixed linear models with random effects for state and zip code. $^{\dagger}p < 0.10, ^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A8: Interacting Policing Context and Proximal Contact

	Evaluation of Police	Turnout	Participatory Acts
(Intercept)	6.78 (0.75)*	0.49 (0.06)*	0.67 (0.17)*
% Invest. Stops Ratio	−1.32 (0.45)*	0.02 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.10)
Proximal carceral contact	−1.85 (0.49)*	0.01 (0.04)	0.24 (0.11)*
Stopped 1-2 times	−0.76 (0.37)*	−0.00 (0.03)	0.27 (0.08)*
Stopped 3+ times	−1.25 (0.64)†	0.12 (0.05)*	0.21 (0.14)
Crime victim	0.23 (0.72)	−0.03 (0.06)	0.17 (0.16)
Felony conviction	−0.42 (0.75)	0.01 (0.06)	0.07 (0.17)
Income	0.06 (0.06)	0.01 (0.00)*	0.03 (0.01)*
Conservatism	0.75 (0.16)*	−0.02 (0.01)†	−0.10 (0.04)*
Education	0.11 (0.15)	0.06 (0.01)*	0.14 (0.03)*
Woman	−0.21 (0.37)	0.05 (0.03)	0.06 (0.08)
White	3.52 (0.42)*	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.24 (0.09)*
Age	0.47 (0.18)*	0.10 (0.02)*	0.03 (0.04)
Stops Ratio * Proximal	0.85 (0.68)	−0.11 (0.06)†	−0.12 (0.15)
AIC	4531.02	811.10	2275.30
BIC	4609.90	889.98	2354.17
Log Likelihood	−2248.51	−388.55	−1120.65
Num. obs.	765	765	765
Num. groups: zip:Illinois	487	487	487
Num. groups: Illinois	2	2	2
Var: zip:Illinois (Intercept)	0.66	0.00	0.07
Var: Illinois (Intercept)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Var: Residual	20.44	0.15	0.98

Pools those with any proximal contact together. Mixed linear models with random effects for state and zip code. $^{\dagger}p < 0.10$,$^{*}p < 0.05$

Table A9: Investigative Stops Ratio Recoded as Racial Disparity

	Evaluation of Police	Turnout	Participatory Acts
(Intercept)	6.71 (0.75)*	0.49 (0.06)*	0.68 (0.17)*
% Invest. Stops Ratio	−0.98 (0.39)*	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.07 (0.09)
Stopped 1-2 times	−0.80 (0.37)*	−0.00 (0.03)	0.28 (0.08)*
Stopped 3+ times	−1.20 (0.64)†	0.11 (0.05)*	0.20 (0.14)
Proximal carceral contact	−1.05 (0.25)*	−0.01 (0.02)	0.13 (0.06)*
Crime victim	0.26 (0.72)	−0.04 (0.06)	0.17 (0.16)
Felony conviction	−0.24 (0.76)	0.01 (0.06)	0.04 (0.17)
Income	0.06 (0.06)	0.01 (0.00)*	0.03 (0.01)*
Conservatism	0.74 (0.16)*	−0.02 (0.01)†	−0.09 (0.04)*
Education	0.10 (0.15)	0.06 (0.01)*	0.14 (0.03)*
Woman	−0.22 (0.37)	0.05 (0.03)†	0.06 (0.08)
White	3.50 (0.42)*	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.22 (0.09)*
Age	0.50 (0.18)*	0.10 (0.02)*	0.02 (0.04)
AIC	4531.44	810.30	2272.34
BIC	4605.68	884.54	2346.58
Log Likelihood	−2249.72	−389.15	−1120.17
Num. obs.	765	765	765
Num. groups: zip:Illinois	487	487	487
Num. groups: Illinois	2	2	2
Var: zip:Illinois (Intercept)	0.63	0.00	0.08
Var: Illinois (Intercept)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Var: Residual	20.46	0.15	0.97

Percentage investigative stops variable recoded as an absolute value. Numbers higher than 0 indicate racial inequality in stops, but do not differentiate between directions of inequality. Mixed linear models with random effects for state and zip code. $^\dagger p < 0.10$,$^* p < 0.05$

Table A10: Dropping Municipalities That Are More Likely to Stop White Motorists

	Evaluation of Police	Turnout	Participatory Acts
(Intercept)	6.88 (0.78)*	0.48 (0.07)*	0.68 (0.17)*
% Invest. Stops Ratio	−0.95 (0.40)*	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.09)
Stopped 1-2 times	−0.69 (0.39)†	−0.00 (0.03)	0.24 (0.09)*
Stopped 3+ times	−1.65 (0.66)*	0.13 (0.06)*	0.21 (0.15)
Proximal carceral contact	−0.95 (0.26)*	−0.02 (0.02)	0.13 (0.06)*
Crime victim	0.27 (0.75)	−0.00 (0.06)	0.18 (0.17)
Felony conviction	−0.44 (0.80)	−0.02 (0.07)	0.03 (0.18)
Income	0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.01)†	0.03 (0.01)*
Conservatism	0.76 (0.17)*	−0.03 (0.01)†	−0.10 (0.04)*
Education	0.07 (0.16)	0.06 (0.01)*	0.14 (0.03)*
Woman	−0.32 (0.38)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.09)
White	3.48 (0.43)*	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.21 (0.10)*
Age	0.45 (0.19)*	0.11 (0.02)*	0.01 (0.04)
AIC	4168.15	759.82	2091.25
BIC	4241.04	832.70	2164.13
Log Likelihood	−2068.07	−363.91	−1029.62
Num. obs.	703	703	703
Num. groups: zip:Illinois	436	436	436
Num. groups: Illinois	2	2	2
Var: zip:Illinois (Intercept)	0.52	0.00	0.06
Var: Illinois (Intercept)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Var: Residual	20.65	0.15	0.98

Percentage investigative stops variable recoded so that 0 indicates an equal ratio of Black and White investigative stops. Numbers higher than 0 indicate racial inequality in stops, but do not differentiate between directions of inequality. Mixed linear models with random effects for state and zip code. $^{\dagger}p < 0.10$,* $p < 0.05$

Table A11: Dropping Municipalities with < 10 stops of Whites or Blacks

	Evaluation of Police	Turnout	Participatory Acts
(Intercept)	6.71 (0.75)*	0.49 (0.06)*	0.70 (0.17)*
% Invest. Stops Ratio	−1.04 (0.38)*	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.09 (0.09)
Stopped 1-2 times	−0.78 (0.38)*	−0.01 (0.03)	0.27 (0.08)*
Stopped 3+ times	−1.20 (0.64)†	0.11 (0.05)*	0.20 (0.14)
Proximal carceral contact	−1.04 (0.26)*	−0.01 (0.02)	0.13 (0.06)*
Crime victim	0.26 (0.73)	−0.04 (0.06)	0.17 (0.16)
Felony conviction	−0.25 (0.76)	0.01 (0.06)	0.04 (0.17)
Income	0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.00)*	0.03 (0.01)*
Conservatism	0.74 (0.16)*	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.09 (0.04)*
Education	0.11 (0.15)	0.06 (0.01)*	0.14 (0.03)*
Woman	−0.22 (0.37)	0.06 (0.03)†	0.06 (0.08)
White	3.45 (0.42)*	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.23 (0.09)*
Age	0.49 (0.18)*	0.10 (0.02)*	0.02 (0.04)
AIC	4495.30	798.02	2256.30
BIC	4569.40	872.11	2330.39
Log Likelihood	−2231.65	−383.01	−1112.15
Num. obs.	758	758	758
Num. groups: zip:Illinois	480	480	480
Num. groups: Illinois	2	2	2
Var: zip:Illinois (Intercept)	0.59	0.00	0.07
Var: Illinois (Intercept)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Var: Residual	20.64	0.15	0.98

Restricted to respondents in municipalities that have at least 10 investigatory stops of both White and Black motorists. Mixed linear models with random effects for state and zip code. $^\dagger p < 0.10, ^* p < 0.05$

Table A12: Dropping Municipalities with < 50 stops of Whites or Blacks

	Evaluation of Police	Turnout	Participatory Acts
(Intercept)	6.85 (0.76)*	0.52 (0.06)*	0.74 (0.17)*
% Invest. Stops Ratio	−1.07 (0.38)*	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.10 (0.09)
Stopped 1-2 times	−0.76 (0.38)*	−0.01 (0.03)	0.27 (0.08)*
Stopped 3+ times	−1.21 (0.65)†	0.11 (0.05)*	0.19 (0.14)
Proximal carceral contact	−1.04 (0.26)*	−0.01 (0.02)	0.14 (0.06)*
Crime victim	0.24 (0.74)	−0.05 (0.06)	0.20 (0.16)
Felony conviction	−0.30 (0.77)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.17)
Income	0.06 (0.06)	0.01 (0.01)*	0.03 (0.01)*
Conservatism	0.68 (0.17)*	−0.03 (0.01)*	−0.11 (0.04)*
Education	0.13 (0.15)	0.06 (0.01)*	0.14 (0.03)*
Woman	−0.31 (0.38)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.08)
White	3.48 (0.42)*	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.23 (0.09)*
Age	0.48 (0.18)*	0.10 (0.02)*	0.02 (0.04)
AIC	4383.90	782.63	2201.08
BIC	4457.59	856.32	2274.77
Log Likelihood	−2175.95	−375.32	−1084.54
Num. obs.	739	739	739
Num. groups: zip:Illinois	462	462	462
Num. groups: Illinois	2	2	2
Var: zip:Illinois (Intercept)	0.63	0.00	0.08
Var: Illinois (Intercept)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Var: Residual	20.63	0.15	0.98

Restricted to respondents in municipalities that have at least 50 investigatory stops of both White and Black motorists. Mixed linear models with random effects for state and zip code. $^\dagger p < 0.10$,$^* p < 0.05$

Table A13: Dropping Municipalities with < 100 stops of Whites or Blacks

	Evaluation of Police	Turnout	Participatory Acts
(Intercept)	6.72 (0.76)*	0.52 (0.06)*	0.77 (0.17)*
% Invest. Stops Ratio	−1.06 (0.39)*	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.11 (0.09)
Stopped 1-2 times	−0.71 (0.38)†	−0.01 (0.03)	0.26 (0.08)*
Stopped 3+ times	−1.19 (0.65)†	0.11 (0.05)*	0.19 (0.14)
Proximal carceral contact	−1.01 (0.26)*	−0.01 (0.02)	0.14 (0.06)*
Crime victim	0.23 (0.74)	−0.05 (0.06)	0.20 (0.17)
Felony conviction	−0.33 (0.77)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.17)
Income	0.06 (0.06)	0.01 (0.01)*	0.03 (0.01)*
Conservatism	0.68 (0.17)*	−0.03 (0.01)*	−0.11 (0.04)*
Education	0.15 (0.15)	0.06 (0.01)*	0.14 (0.03)*
Woman	−0.34 (0.38)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.08)
White	3.48 (0.42)*	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.23 (0.09)*
Age	0.50 (0.18)*	0.10 (0.02)*	0.02 (0.04)
AIC	4348.70	779.25	2185.27
BIC	4422.26	852.81	2258.82
Log Likelihood	−2158.35	−373.63	−1076.63
Num. obs.	733	733	733
Num. groups: zip:Illinois	456	456	456
Num. groups: Illinois	2	2	2
Var: zip:Illinois (Intercept)	0.63	0.00	0.08
Var: Illinois (Intercept)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Var: Residual	20.64	0.15	0.98

Restricted to respondents in municipalities that have at least 100 investigatory stops of both White and Black motorists. Mixed linear models with random effects for state and zip code. $^\dagger p < 0.10$,$^* p < 0.05$